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Introduction 
The construction of a European ‘Banking Union’ is one of the most significant 
developments in European integration since the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty. 
Banking Union was proposed by the European heads of government and state in June 
2012 to: restore confidence in European banking systems weakened by the double 
whammy of the international financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis; break the 
sovereign debt-bank doom loop that plagued the euro area periphery; counter-act the 
growing fragmentation of European financial markets since the outbreak of the 
international financial crisis; and – in the words of Council President Herman Von 
Rompuy (2012) – ‘complete’ Economic and Monetary Union, thus saving the euro 
and protecting it better from future shocks (Howarth and Quaglia 2013, see also 
Donnelly 2013). Banking Union was to be based on five components: a single 
rulebook on bank capital and liquidity; a single framework for banking supervision; a 
single framework for the managed resolution of banks and financial institutions; a 
common deposit guarantee scheme; and a common backstop for temporary financial 
support (European Council, 2012b&c).  
From June 2012, there were negotiations on four of the five elements of a 
Banking Union and, with the exception of the deposit guarantee scheme, agreements 
were reached by the spring of 2014. In September 2012, the European Commission 
proposed a regulation for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
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(SSM) (European Commission 2012b), which was agreed in amended form by the 
December 2012 European Council (2012a) and adopted by the European Parliament 
(EP) and the Council in October 2013. The adoption of European Union (EU) capital 
requirements legislation in early 2013 reinforced the single rule book – although 
many lacuna remained. A directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD), 
proposed by the Commission on 6 June 2012 (European Commission 2012a), was 
agreed by the Council on 27 June 2013, approved in an institutional trialogue 
(Council, Commission and EP) on 12 December 2013, and finally adopted by the EP 
in April 2014. The BRRD, which applies to all EU Member States, sets out rules for 
the ‘bail-in’ of struggling and failing banks which enable authorities to recapitalise a 
failing bank by writing-down liabilities and / or converting them to equity with the 
aim of continuing a bank as a going concern, decreasing financial system instability 
and giving authorities the opportunity to reorganise the bank or resolve it (European 
Commission 2014).  
In July 2013, the Commission proposed a regulation for the creation of the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (European Commission, 2013) which in a 
considerably modified form was agreed by government leaders in December 2013 
(Council of Ministers, 2013) and then adopted by the Council and the European 
Parliament in March 2014. The Commission had previously proposed a directive on 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) (European Commission 2010), which was stalled. 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) began operation in September 2012 to 
replace eventually the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
(Hodson 2013). It was envisaged that, subject to certain conditions, the ESM could 
provide financial support to ailing banks and an amount was allocated specifically to 
Spanish banks via a national recapitalisation fund (FROB).  
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 However, despite these remarkable achievements, the move to a Banking 
Union was delayed in 2013 due to differences over the design and operation of the 
SRM, between the German government and a few northern European Member States, 
on the one hand, and the EU institutions, France and euro periphery Member States, 
on the other. While many had previously hoped that the Banking Union would be up 
and running in 2013, by the end of the year it was clear that the system would not be 
operational until 2015 and then in a much watered down form from what the Member 
States had called for in June 2012. Negotiations on the SRM centred around four 
specific issues: the scope and membership of the SRM, the centralisation of decision-
making authority, the sources of funding and the mechanism’s legal basis.  
 The SRM, together with the SSM, was designed to address what we label the 
‘financial inconsistent quartet’, that builds on the ‘financial trilemma’ outlined by 
Dirk Schoenmaker (2011, 2013). The trilemma examines the interplay of financial 
stability, cross-border banking and national financial policies, arguing that any two of 
the three objectives can be combined but not all three: one has to give way. While 
Schoenmaker presents an economic analysis to explain the existence of the trilemma, 
this contribution examines national preference formation with regard to the three 
objectives of the trilemma and how national preferences shaped one of the main 
elements of Banking Union: the SRM.  
We argue that in the EU there is a fourth element to be considered, namely 
participation in the single currency. The effective elimination of the ‘lender of last 
resort’ function at the national level in EMU and its legal elimination at the 
supranational level (article 127, TFEU) created greater potential for financial 
instability, especially in the context of the growth in cross-border banking and the 
rapid expansion of bank balance sheets during the first seven years of the single 
 5 
currency. Hence, the trilemma became, for euro area Member States, an ‘inconsistent 
quartet’. We also argue that the analytical usefulness of this concept to explain 
national preferences on the SRM relies upon its nuanced application to individual 
countries, taking into account national policy-maker concerns regarding moral hazard, 
with positions determined largely by Member State current account positions and 
national banking systems (and notably the internationalisation of national banking 
systems and the increased cross-border activities of banks). This contribution focuses 
specifically on one element of Banking Union – the SRM – although our argument 
also applies to the other elements (supervision, common deposit guarantee and the 
fiscal backstop).  
 Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we summarise our understanding of 
the inconsistent quartet and how different EU Member States relate to this quartet 
given different positioning on moral hazard issues and very different national banking 
systems. Second, we seek to explain German reluctance on the SRM which is 
important because of the significant German government influence in shaping the 
overall design of Banking Union. Third, we examine the intergovernmental debate on 
the SRM and the effort of three EU institutions – the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the European Central Bank – to challenge German efforts to weaken 
the resolution mechanism and delay its coming into operation.  
 
I. The ‘inconsistent quartet’ in EMU 
In his seminal work, Dirk Schoenmaker’s describes and analyses the ‘financial 
trilemma’ (2011, 2013) based on the interplay of financial stability, cross-border 
banking and national financial policies. In the event that national governments want 
cross-border banking to continue, while maintaining financial stability, the logic runs, 
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they have to accept ‘supranational’ prudential regulation and supervision. 
Schoenmaker focuses upon global bank governance but he dedicates a couple of 
pages in his conclusion to the need for European Banking Union. We argue that for 
the large majority of EU Member States, there is a fourth element to be considered, 
namely the single currency. Hence, the trilemma becomes an ‘inconsistent quartet’. 
We borrow from Padoa-Schioppa’s (1982) use of the term, applied to the context of 
European monetary integration, just as Schoenmaker’s trilemma borrows from 
Mundell-Fleming (Fleming 1962; Mundell 1963).  
On the one hand, the single currency reinforced financial (including banking) 
integration in the euro area, with a massive rise in cross-border banking in the euro 
area from 1999 (see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013). On the other hand, the single 
currency undermined national financial policies, because the function of lender of last 
resort – previously performed by the national central bank in providing liquidity – 
could no longer be performed effectively at either the national level or, legally at least, 
by the European Central Bank (ECB). Moreover, national resolution powers were 
constrained by EU / euro area fiscal rules. Consequently, national authorities had 
fewer tools at their disposal to safeguard financial stability, which encouraged them to 
look to supranational solutions.  
The inconsistent quartet asserts that euro area Member State governments 
sought but could not obtain all four objectives. We assume that the maintenance of the 
single currency was a prioritised goal for euro area Member States – although the 
implications of membership for financial stability and control varied given that 
Member States were affected differently by lender of last resort concerns. The 
inconsistent quartet also leads to the hypothesis that in euro area Member States 
where the banking system was less internationalised and domestic banks were less 
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engaged in cross-border banking activities, interest in the supranationalisation of 
prudential regulation and supervision was likely to be more limited. Further, EU 
Member States unlikely to join the single currency in the near future – even those 
with highly internationalised banking systems and home to banks with an important 
cross-border presence such as the United Kingdom and Sweden – had less interest in 
joining Banking Union, in part because lender of last resort functions remained intact. 
 The inter-related global financial crisis that erupted in 2007 and the sovereign 
debt crisis that broke out in 2010, highlighted the difficulties arising from the 
inconsistent quartet within EMU – even if the ECB mitigated financial instability by 
providing liquidity and governments were, temporarily, permitted to break EU fiscal 
policy rules and bailed out a range of banks. The crisis was also necessary to 
overcome the entrenched opposition in a range of euro area Member States reluctant 
to transfer prudential supervision and bank resolution functions from the national to 
the supranational level. Prior to 2012, home country control of supervision dominated 
and financial support for failing banks came almost entirely from national fiscal 
authorities according to national priorities – proving Mervyn King’s adage that banks 
are ‘international in life but national in death’.1 The collapse or threatened collapse of 
a range of cross-border European banks in the context of the two crises and threat to 
other banking systems reinforced the logic of moving beyond unilateral or ad hoc 
arrangements. The sovereign debt-bank doom loop in the euro area periphery Member 
States further undermined the ability of their governments to rescue or resolve failing 
banks (for further details, see Howarth and Quaglia, 2013).  
 For these reasons, euro area Member States decided (with reluctance in several 
cases) to explore the move to a Banking Union, thus replacing the third objective of 
                                                
1 See Turner Review (2009) p. 36. 
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Schoenmaker’s trilemma, namely the maintenance of what he refers to as ‘national 
financial policies’. National financial policies in the context of the euro area include 
regulation, which even prior to Banking Union was in part set at the EU level; 
supervision, which for large systemically important banks was to be undertaken by 
the ECB through its new Supervisory Board in the SSM; resolution, which was to be 
performed by the SRM; a deposit guarantee scheme to be replaced by some kind of 
common European scheme; and even the lender of last resort function becoming – in 
addition to de facto ECB support – a European fiscal backstop for struggling and 
failing banks. Some argued that all of these elements were necessary in order to make 
Banking Union work (Gros and Schoenmaker 2014). However, euro area Member 
State governments facing the inconsistent quartet had different preferences on the 
various elements of a Banking Union, depending on the concern of national policy 
makers for moral hazard created by BU-level financial support for banks and 
sovereigns and the configuration of their national banking system. Preoccupation with 
moral hazard depended on whether a Member State was more or less likely to be a net 
contributor to the proposed single resolution fund and the ability of national 
authorities to resolve banks headquartered in the Member State. While our 
inconsistent quartet allows us to predict interest in a Banking Union throughout the 
euro area, it also helps us to explain German reluctance which stems, we argue, from 
moral hazard concerns but also the specific features of the German banking system, 
notably its limited internationalisation.  
 
II. Explaining German Reluctance: Moral Hazard, Legal Challenge and the 
Sparkassen 
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Germany – as the euro area Member State with the largest economy and one of the 
largest banking system measured in total assets, the largest current account surplus 
and one of the more stable economic, financial and fiscal positions – would almost 
inevitably make net contributions through the support and resolution mechanisms of 
Banking Union. Enjoying a kind of veto power – although one constrained by the 
threat of sovereign debt default in the euro periphery, contagion and euro area 
disintegration – Germany had more influence on the design of Banking Union than 
other euro area Member States. The German government’s position thus merits 
further consideration and, specifically, the German concern for moral hazard, the 
potential of legal challenge and the pre-occupation with the impact of Banking Union 
on public sector savings banks (Sparkassen). 
From November 2011, Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble directly linked 
the use of European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds to help banks to the creation of 
the SSM in order to limit the effects of moral hazard, demanding that strong 
conditions be imposed on both sovereigns (supervisors) and banks that receive ESM 
funds (Boone and Johnson 2011). 2  For sovereigns (supervisors), the potential 
availability of EU-level financial support for banks might effectively encourage them 
to loosen national regulation and/or supervision, allowing potentially riskier activities 
which in turn undermines the pursuit of Member State governments to discourage 
these activities given that national tax payers and/or depositors will be less expected 
to pick up the tab for saving banks (Micossi et al., 2011). To obtain ESM funds 
(potentially), according to this logic, Member State governments had to accept further 
constraints on their autonomy in financial regulation and supervision, and banks had 
to accept a potentially reinforced regulatory and supervisory framework.  
                                                
2 New York Times, 18 November 2011 ; European Voice, 16 February 2012. 
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The agreement to allocate ESM financial support to save struggling banks also 
created a moral hazard for banks – already a concern at the national level in the 
context of widespread bail-outs in the aftermath of the international financial crisis. 
The standard argument runs that banks are more likely to engage in riskier activities 
in the knowledge that they will be bailed out in the context of crisis. German 
preoccupation with the moral hazard created by EU-level support was demonstrated 
clearly in the intergovernmental debates over the Cyprus bail-out in March 2013 and 
in the German insistence on the significant bail-in of uninsured depositors (Pisani-
Ferry 2013). 
 The creation of an SRM with a single resolution fund also created moral 
hazard for both sovereigns and banks. The German government had already 
implemented its own bank restructuring and resolution mechanisms and urged other 
Member States to do so. German policy here contradicted the longstanding position of 
several other Member States, including France, the governments of which were 
previously hostile to national resolution mechanisms precisely on moral hazard 
grounds (Hardie and Howarth, 2009). With the SRM, the German government 
(amongst others) were principally concerned that the creation of a large EU resolution 
mechanism could create perverse incentives for other Member State governments to 
be more lenient in the regulation and supervision of banks: at the end of the day, EU 
funds could be drawn upon to resolve the bank3. The funds would come from all EU 
banks (or at least those of a certain size), not from governments. So the pressure on 
government resources (and national tax payers) would be limited – especially 
following the creation of a single European fund. Thus, to limit this moral hazard, the 
German government insisted on the precondition of direct ECB supervision for 
                                                
3 Financial Times, 29 April 2013. 
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systemically important banks, EU rules on ‘bail-in’ (that is, initial losses imposed on 
both private sector bond and shareholders – BRRD Art. 37.51-52), with EU level 
support only at the end of a relatively long process/and difficult voting system. But 
these conditions and complexity led many observers to question the credibility of the 
mechanism and the likelihood of EU-level support, which created additional concerns 
about the resolution of banks and potentially undermined investor / international 
confidence in the long term stability of euro area periphery financial systems. 
 German policy-makers were also preoccupied with the compatibility of the 
SRM with the German Basic Law. Here, the German concern, as with the 
establishment of the ESM and the proposed Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme, was 
that German taxpayers would be required to step in to support the SRM without 
constitutionally required parliamentary approval. In particular, German policy makers 
were concerned with the transition period when national resolution funds would exist, 
prior to the mutualisation of these funds into a single EU fund. In particular, the 
German federal government favoured a two-step approach to the creation of the SRM, 
starting with a network of national authorities and creating a centralized authority in 
the future and only once EU treaties had been changed and appropriate measures 
enacted to protect national taxpayers.4  
 The BRRD and the SRM were to apply all EU-headquartered banks. The 
directive was to enforce losses upon share- and bondholders of all EU-headquartered 
banks prior to a taxpayer funded bail-out or resolution. However, it was highly 
unlikely that SRM funds would be needed to cover the resolution of smaller banks. 
The ECB was unlikely to be in a position to force resolution upon smaller German 
                                                
4 Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2013.  
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banks (notably the German Cooperative Banks or the publicly owned Sparkassen), 
except in the very unlikely circumstance that the Supervisory Board of the SSM 
sought to extend direct control over the supervision of these institutions – a possibility 
created in the SSM regulation in the event that the Board deemed (by a majority of its 
members) necessary to ensure the consistent application of ‘high’ supervisory 
standards. Member State finance ministers could also initiate the resolution through 
the SRM of any EU-headquartered bank but it was highly unlikely that this would 
involve smaller German institutions. 
 German reluctance on the SRM can thus be seen as stemming from the 
structural reality that very few of its banks would be covered. Approximately, twenty-
five German banks were to be subject to direct ECB supervision: a range of 
commercial banks and all the remaining public sector Landesbanken. The percentage 
of total bank assets covered by direct ECB supervision was the lowest of any euro 
area (Banking Union) Member State given that the German banking system was the 
least concentrated in Europe.5 Almost one-third of the euro area’s banks were German, 
including slightly more than 420 Sparkassen (publicly owned savings banks) and 
1200 Cooperative banks (2011 figures), none of which would be covered by direct 
ECB supervision. 
 Applying the ‘inconsistent quartet’ to Germany, we would expect less interest 
in Banking Union generally and, more specifically, in the creation of the SRM – 
                                                
5 According the Herfindahl index, Germany is consistently the least concentrated 
banking system in the European Union and has an index approximately one-fifth that 
of the euro area average (ECB 2013; ECB Statistical Warehouse). The five largest 
credit institutions consistently have the lowest percentage of total bank assets of any 
national banking system in the EU (ECB Statistical Warehouse). 
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despite German participation in the single currency – because the German banking 
system was one of the least internationalised in the euro area both in terms of foreign 
bank penetration and the international presence of national banks.6 The bulk of bank 
assets were nationally held with the exception of the biggest two and a small number 
of other much smaller commercial banks.7 Although Germany was home to one very 
big, highly internationalised, commercial bank – Deutsche Bank – and a second very 
big commercial bank with a significant European presence – Commerzbank – almost 
all the other banks were nationally focused, with operations in nearly all cases limited 
to a small area in Germany. Negligible German interest in European-level funds 
stemmed from the fact that Germany as a comparatively large, rich and solvent 
Member State was unlikely to have financial difficulty bailing-out or resolving any of 
its banks – including the two largest commercial banks. The bank assets to GDP ratio 
in Germany in 2013 was at 300 per cent of GDP, below the EU average of 349 per 
cent, just above the EU median and far lower than the ratios in the Netherlands (397), 
                                                
6 Foreign bank penetration (the branches and subsidiaries of foreign headquartered 
banks) in Germany is at 12.2 per cent of total assets versus the euro area average of 
17.8 per cent (ECB statistical warehouse, 2012 figures). The international presence of 
German headquartered banks reached 28 per cent of total bank assets (2007-2011 
average). When the largest three banks are excluded, only 16 per cent of German bank 
assets were held outside the country. The assets of German banks held outside the 
euro area reached 14.6 and 5.5 per cent respectively.  Figures for British banks were 
40 and 25.6 per cent respectively. Figures for French banks were 25.2 and and 12.6 
per cent respectively. These figures are based on authors’ calculations, using data 
from national central banks. 
7 See the previous footnote. 
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France (423) and the UK (495).8  
 Systemic features of German bank liabilities also resulted in less pre-
occupation for lender of last resort type concerns. Notably, a possible collapse in bank 
liquidity – for example, through a freezing of interbank wholesale markets – was of 
marginal concern in Germany. Only 0.6 per cent of total bank funding was short-term 
wholesale market funding (less than two years) (3.9 per cent of total debt funding) 
(Bundesbank statistics, end 2012). The comparison with French banks is revealing: 
10.8 per cent of French bank funding was short-term wholesale market funding – 
eighteen times the German level (Bank of France Statistics, end 2012). German public 
sector banks relied overwhelmingly on stable long-term wholesale market funding 
(Pfandbriefe) – nearly all of which was domestically held – and government held 
long-term debt (‘silent participations’), while the more traditional Cooperative banks 
relied largely on deposits to fund bank lending. The bulk of German Sparkassen 
enjoyed a lower cost of capital compared to their commercial rivals because they 
relied disproportionately on high levels of funding through ‘silent participations’ and 
were under no obligation to make pay-outs to their local municipality investors. 
 German government concerns over the fate of the Sparkassen determined the 
contours of the Banking Union agreed between December 2012 and March 2014 and 
dictated the reach of ECB direct supervision, which ended up covering only one of the 
more than 420 savings banks. The Sparkassen banks were local or regionally based 
public sector banks with a vested interest in the local economy and a strong presence 
in local community life. They provided the bulk of external finance to the Mittelstand 
(small and medium sized nonfinancial companies), the backbone of the German 
economy. In late 2012, the largest savings bank had a balance sheet of approximately 
                                                
8 The Banker Database, http://www.thebankerdatabase.com. 
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€40bn about one-fiftieth that of Deutsche Bank and more than 100 had less than a 
billion euros in assets.9 
However, the Sparkassen also benefited from being part of a large closely 
linked network and collectively could be considered to be one of the largest financial 
groups in the world with more assets (€1tn) than Deutsche bank, a collective 38 per 
cent share of German bank lending and almost 37 per cent deposits (Bundesbank, end 
2012 figures). Furthermore, the Sparkassen (and Landesbanken) benefited from the 
German regulatory practice that considered loans between these banks as risk-free – 
which meant that no capital had to be held against such exposures. The Sparkassen 
were not required to file combined accounts as a single financial group and accounts 
were first overseen by auditors from within the saving bank group, not external 
auditors. The Sparkassen also benefited from a joint liability scheme 
(Haftungsverbund) which was to provide both bail-out funds and emergency liquidity 
for member banks (Simpson 2013) – although such a scheme in place for the 
Landesbanken did not save German taxpayers from bail-outs and some Sparkassen 
did not contribute the level of aid that corresponded to their ownership stakes. 
Pointing to this joint liability scheme and competent management, the Sparkassen 
representative association, the VOB, vigorously denied the relevance of the Spanish 
caja precedent.10 Sparkassen directors also appeared to be unanimous in their view 
that home regulators better understood their characteristics and way of doing business 
(Simpson 2013).11 Transferring control over their supervision and resolution to the 
supranational level was unacceptable.  
                                                
9 Financial Times, 2 December 2012. 
10 Financial Times, 20 June 2013. 
11 Financial Times, 2 December 2012. 
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III. The Negotiations on the SRM 
In July 2013, the Commission issued a draft regulation to establish the SRM 
(European Commission 2013a), designed to complement the SSM. The Commission 
envisaged the establishment of a Single Resolution Board (SRB), consisting of 
representatives from the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission 
and the national resolution authorities of the Member States where banks had their 
headquarters as well as their branches and/or subsidiaries. According to the initial 
proposal, the ECB, in its role in the SSM, would signal when a bank headquartered in 
a Banking Union Member State was in ‘severe financial difficulties’ and needed ‘to 
be resolved’ (European Commission 2013a). The SRB would be ‘responsible for the 
key decisions on how a bank would be resolved’, with national resolution authorities 
‘closely involved in this work’. The Commission would then decide whether to enter 
a bank into resolution. The Commission, which drafted the proposal, argued that this 
decision could not rest with the SRB ‘for legal reasons’, namely according to the 
Treaty, only an EU institution could take such a decision at the European level, 
precluding an agency (such as the European Banking Authority (EBA)) from 
fulfilling this role (European Commission 2014). 
 National resolution authorities would retain responsibility for executing the 
resolution actions, with the SRB having an oversight role, monitoring implementation 
by national authorities. If the national authorities did not comply with SRB decisions, 
the SRB would have the power to ‘directly address executive orders to the troubled 
banks’ (European Commission 2013a). A Single Bank Resolution Fund would be set 
up under the control of the SRB to provide financial support during the restructuring 
process (European Commission 2013b). It was envisaged that this fund would be 
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created from contributions from the banking sector, through the pooling of the 
resources of national funds of participating Member States. While these funds were 
being built up, however, the Commission proposed that the SRB should be able to 
borrow from the markets (European Commission, 2013a). 
 The draft legislation on the SRM was criticised from both sides. For some, it 
did not go far enough in that it failed to propose the establishment of a true Single 
Resolution Authority, which would have required Treaty revision. Hence, 
responsibilities were split between several layers of decision-making (Deloitte 2013). 
The Commission was assigned the ultimate decision-making power on whether or not 
to initiate a resolution. The SRB was tasked with planning resolutions, whereas 
national authorities were in charge of executing resolutions under national law. The 
actions of the SRB were contingent on the decision of the ECB / SSM to signal that a 
bank was in difficulty. Hence, the SSM’s internal decision-making structure and its 
interaction with national authorities would form a further layer within the SRM 
(Deloitte 2013). Numerous observers, the ECB and the Commission itself had argued 
with great regularity that during crisis, clarity and speed in decision-making were 
crucial for bank crisis management. Nonetheless, the Commission proposed a multi-
layered SRM with many veto points. 
 For other critics, the draft legislation gave too much power to the Commission, 
which would decide whether and when to place a bank into resolution. The head of a 
Bavarian banking association went so far as to liken the Commission’s proposals to 
‘enabling acts’, the laws that the Nazis used to seize power. 12  The German 
government challenged the Commission’s draft on legal grounds, arguing that the 
Commission had overstepped its authority and that a treaty change was required for 
                                                
12 Financial Times, 11 July 2013. 
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such a far-reaching reform.13 German policy-makers feared that their country would 
be the main contributor to the resolution fund and that the Commission would take 
decisions that could have fiscal implications for the Member States. Should the Single 
Resolution fund not have enough financial resources to intervene, national 
governments (and ultimately taxpayers) would have to step in.  
 More specifically, German policy-makers demanded that resolution decisions 
should be taken by the European Council,14 which operates by unanimity allowing 
each member state to retain its veto.  German policy makers also wanted to reduce the 
scope of the SRM: with their own Sparkassen (savings banks) in mind, they sought to 
exclude smaller banks from SRM coverage.15 In this respect, Germany favoured a 
compromise that would mirror the deal reached with reference to the direct 
supervision of banks by the ECB in the SSM which deprived the ECB of involvement 
in the direct supervision of all but 130 banks – although the ECB retained the power 
to intervene in any bank if necessary subject to a majority vote in the SSM’s 
supervisory board.  
 With reference to the Resolution Fund, German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble opposed a pure model for a single European bank rescue fund financed by 
levies on banks. This model was supported by the Commission, the ECB (as 
discussed below), the French government and southern euro area Member State 
governments. German policy-makers favoured a network of national funds in the 
medium term and argued that the setting up of a common fund required treaty 
                                                
13 Financial Times, 6 December 2013. 
14 Financial Times, 6 December 2013. 
15 Financial Times, 6 December 2013; European Voice, 19 September 2013. 
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change.16 According to the Commission’s proposal, contributions to the fund would 
be lower for banks funded mainly through deposits and undertaking lower risk 
activities. However, the German position on fund contributions was more cautious 
than the French and southern European position – despite the large number of small 
banks engaged in ‘traditional’ banking activities in Germany. The two largest German 
commercial banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, fought a rear guard battle 
against the proposed funding scheme which would hit them on both fronts (deposits 
and risk activities).17 Germany also insisted on bringing forward rules to impose 
losses on senior creditors in banks to 2015. These bail-in measures, which were 
included in the BRRD, had been resisted by France, Italy and Spain.18 
 In the run up to the decisive Ecofin meeting in December 2013, Dutch policy 
makers floated the idea of splitting the SRM proposal into two parts, to be discussed 
in parallel negotiations. One part concerned the scope and decision-making 
mechanism of the SRM, the other part concerned the Single Resolution Fund.19 With 
reference to the Fund, a compromise solution proposed by Dutch policy makers was a 
system whereby the resolution fund of the bank’s home state would be used before 
other Member States’ funds were utilised. The Financial Times also reported a 
possible compromise on the banks covered by the system, leaving national authorities 
in the lead in resolving smaller banks, as favoured by German policy makers.20  
                                                
16 Financial Times, 6 December 2013. 
17 Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2013. 
18 Financial Times, 6 December 2013. 
19 Bloomberg, 10 December 2013. 
20 Financial Times, 6 December 2013. 
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 Another contentious issue in the negotiations on the SRM was how to proceed 
if national resolution funds were insufficient to deal with a big bank’s failure. German 
government officials argued that if the resolution funds were insufficient to resolve an 
ailing bank, the national authorities (and in the end, the taxpayers) of the home 
country should cover the costs. France and some Southern European countries called 
for the use of the ESM as a common backstop. For example, French Finance Minister 
Pierre Moscovici reiterated his support for a Single Resolution Fund with a ‘unique 
backstop’ to cover shortfalls while the fund was filled with levies on the banking 
industry.21  
 On 18 December 2013, an agreement was reached in the Council of Ministers 
on the draft regulation on the SRM (Council 2013). In addition, a decision was 
adopted by euro area Member States that committed them to negotiate an 
intergovernmental agreement on the functioning of the Single Resolution Fund by 
March 2014. The draft regulation agreed by the Council established that ‘upon 
notification by the European Central Bank that a bank was failing or likely to fail, or 
on its own initiative, the SRB would adopt a resolution scheme placing a bank into 
resolution’. It would decide on the application of resolution tools and the use of the 
single resolution fund. ‘Decisions by the Board would enter into force within 24 hours 
of their adoption, unless the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal by the 
Commission, objected or called for changes’ (Council 2013). This was an important 
change, advocated first and foremost by Germany, compared to the original 
Commission draft, which gave the Commission the power to decide on the resolution 
of a bank. It was agreed that the SRB would consist of an executive director, four full-
time appointed members and the representatives of the national resolution authorities 
                                                
21 Bloomberg, 10 December 2013. 
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of all the participating countries. The Commission and ECB would only have 
observer status. Any decisions with significant financial implications for the fund 
would be taken by a two-thirds majority of the board members representing at least 50 
per cent of contributions. According to the version of the regulation agreed in 
December 2013, a decision to close down a bank would need the approval of a large 
number of actors including: the European Commission; the Council of Ministers; the 
supervisory board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the ECB); as well as the 
executive board of the Single Resolution Mechanism, and its plenary council. 
 The SRM was to cover all banks in the participating Member States. However, 
the Germans succeeded in getting adopted their position that the Board would be 
responsible for the resolution only of those banks directly supervised by the ECB.  
National resolution authorities would be responsible for the resolution of all other 
banks, except if a bank required access to the Single Resolution Fund, which in the 
case of Germany was unlikely. National authorities would also be responsible for 
executing bank resolution plans under the control of the single resolution board 
(Council 2013). In order to guarantee Member State budgetary sovereignty, the SRM 
could not require governments to provide extraordinary public support to any bank 
under resolution (Commission 2013c).  
 The version of the regulation agreed by Member States in December 2013 
created a Single Resolution Fund that would be financed by bank levies raised at the 
national level. It would initially consist of national compartments that would be 
gradually merged over 10 years. During this period, mutualisation between national 
compartments would progressively increase (Council 2013). So while during the first 
year the cost of resolving banks (after bail-in) would mainly come from the 
compartments of the Member States where the banks are located, this share would 
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gradually decrease and the contribution from other participating countries' 
compartments would increase. The December version of the regulation also endorsed 
the bail-in rules set by the BRRD as applicable to the use of the Single Resolution 
Fund. The SRM would gradually merge national resolution funds into a single 
European one over a decade, with the target funding level of €55bn by 2026 or about 
one per cent of all insured deposits.22 In the end, it was decided that during the 
building up of resolution funds, national governments would collectively have to 
provide the extra funding to resolve national ailing banks, if necessary by requesting a 
loan from the ESM. A fully shared backstop would be available only once national 
resolution funds reached their target level and were fully merged.23 From this point on 
the SRM could no longer borrow from the ESM. 
 The German government refused to include in the regulation the most 
sensitive elements of the SRM package, notably specific provisions on the transfer 
and pooling of Member State funded compartments into a single mutualised fund. 
These were placed in an intergovernmental side agreement. The Germans insisted 
upon subsequent intergovernmental agreements among participating Member States 
to permit the transfer of national funds towards the Single Resolution Fund and the 
activation of the mutualisation of the national compartments. The Germans sought an 
intergovernmental agreement in order to eliminate European Parliament involvement 
on these matters and minimise the Commission’s role.24 Moreover, the December 
compromise ensured that the SRM regulation was not to apply before the 
intergovernmental agreement entered into force – which was to take place following 
                                                
22 The Guardian, 19 December 2013. 
23 Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2013; The Guardian, 19 December 2013. 
24 European Voice, 12 December 2013. 
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ratification by participating Member States representing 80 per cent of contributions 
to the Single Resolution Fund. 
 
The EU institutions battle for the SRM 
The European Parliament, the European Central Bank and the Commission joined 
forces in challenging elements of the regulation / intergovernmental agreement 
compromise of the December European Council. The EP questioned the need for an 
intergovernmental agreement to formulate the details on the functioning of the Single 
Resolution Fund to be used in bank resolution (European Parliament 2014a). In a 
letter sent to the EU’s rotating presidency of the Council, the EP argued that the 
‘intergovernmental agreement on Single Resolution Fund is illegal because it 
bypasses the established legislative processes of the Union’.25 The Parliament did not 
even formally recognise the Council text of the side agreement – regarding which it 
had no formal role. However, the EP retained some leverage on the side agreement, 
because of its co-decision power on the SRM regulation.  
 To further complicate negotiations, the version of the regulation adopted by 
the EP in January 2014 was significantly different from that agreed by the Council. 
MEPs restated the requests that ‘all banks must be treated equally, irrespective of 
which country they are established in, and that the system must be credible and 
efficient’ (European Parliament 2014a). They called for a simplification of the 
resolution decision-making process by creating a stronger, more centralised authority, 
with the Supervisory Board of the SSM possessing the final say over bank resolution 
without political interference. They also wanted to remove Germany’s safeguards so 
that the Single Resolution Fund would be available sooner, with access to a 
                                                
25 Financial Times, 16 January 2014. 
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centralised / common credit line. A further EP demand was to accelerate the 
mutualisation of the Fund so as to complete it by 2018 rather than 2026. Informal 
'trialogue' negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council, assisted by 
the Commission, began in early 2014 with a view to reaching a first reading 
agreement on the proposal before EP elections in May 2014.26   
 Over a period of a fortnight in April 2013, all six of the ECB Executive Board 
members came out publicly in favour of a rapid move to a SRM even though this was 
clearly at odds with the German government’s more gradualist version (see, for 
example, Mersch 2013).27 In November 2013, the ECB issued a 32-page opinion 
signed by Mario Draghi that the SRB should be, from the start, a single ‘strong and 
independent’ body, thus directly challenging the German position that the SRM 
should begin as a network of national authorities.28 The ECB argued that ‘co-
ordination between national resolution systems has not proved sufficient to achieve 
the most timely and cost-effective resolution decisions, particularly in a cross-border 
context’.29 The ECB also insisted that treaty change was unnecessary to create the 
new body.30  
                                                
26 Febelfin, 20 December 2013, available at http://www.febelfin.be/en/eu-flash-single-
resolution-mechanism-bank-recovery-and-resolution-brrd-deposit-guarantee-scheme-
bank 
27 Financial Times, 29 April 2013. 
28 Financial Times, 8 November 2013. 
29 Financial Times, 8 November 2013. 
30 Bloomberg, 17 December 2013, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-16/draghi-says-european-bank-resolution-
plan-may-be-too-cumbersome.html. 
 25 
Following the December European Council compromise, Vitor Constâncio, a 
member of the ECB's executive board, expressed the ECB’s fear that the markets 
would find the proposed resolution process insufficiently credible because it was too 
complex and involved too many policy makers to work with the necessary speed in 
crisis situations (ECB 2012). Constâncio also warned that to be credible, the national 
bank-resolution funds needed to have access to outside financing, especially in the 
period when national resolution funds were being built up. 31  He criticised the 
December agreement because it did not allow the resolution funds to borrow on the 
financial markets to raise extra funding: ‘We are talking here not about a final 
backstop, we are talking here about a credit line, which is a system that exists for 
instance in the US…. You should flesh out the possibility of the fund borrowing in 
the markets to have bridge financing to complete the resolution process’.32 
 Michel Barnier, the EU Commissioner responsible for financial services, 
remained concerned about the ability of the SRM to take difficult decisions to close a 
bank quickly or secretly enough. He argued that ‘decision-making within the SRM 
[was] still too complex with a consultation system which [slowed] down the process 
unnecessarily. What we are building is a single system and not a multi-storey 
intergovernmental network’.33 Concerns similar to those expressed by the ECB and 
the Commission were also aired by policy makers outside the EU. Jack Lew, the US 
Treasury secretary stated: ‘We don’t think it’s big enough. We don’t think it’s fast 
enough’.34 
                                                
31 Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2013; The Guardian, 19 December 2013. 
32 The Telegraph, 18 December 2013. 
33 The Telegraph, 18 December 2013. 
34 Financial Times, 16 January 2014. 
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Conclusion 
In 2013, most of the policy discussions on Banking Union focused on the issue of 
bank resolution, with the agreements on the BRRD in June and December and the 
publication of the Commission’s draft SRM proposal in the summer of 2013. Two 
different amended versions of the regulation were adopted by the Council and the EP 
in December 2013 and January 2014 respectively. Afterwards, the main difficulty 
consisted of reconciling the two texts, with a view to adopting the new rules before 
the EP elections in May 2014. The text approved by the Council also envisaged an 
intergovernmental agreement to be reached by March 2014. The EP strongly opposed 
this side agreement, arguing that all the new rules concerning the SRM should be part 
of ordinary EU law and co-decided by the Council and Parliament.  
 The EP unsuccessfully attempted to bring the elements of the December 
intergovernmental side agreement into the regulation, winning only limited 
concessions in the 20 March 2014 compromise with the Council:  a decreased period 
of eight years during which the national compartments would merge; an increased 
proportion of the Fund shared at an earlier stage; and a marginally increased role 
performed by the Commission in the Single Resolution Board – allowing the Council 
to reject resolution proposals only under certain conditions. 35  Although the 
Commission was to have a limited role in the SRM, Member State governments 
retained their vetoes on mutualisation and an important say on the use of resolution 
funds. A messy compromise was reached on triggering the resolution process. It was 
agreed that the ECB (the SSM’s supervisory board) would hold the trigger, being 
responsible for deciding whether or not a bank should be resolved. The Single 
                                                
35 Financial Times, 20 March 2014. 
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Resolution Board would ask the ECB take such a decision and if the ECB declined to 
do so, then the Board itself would take the decision. The ECB was therefore to be the 
main ‘triggering’ authority but the Board might also play a role if the ECB was 
reluctant or hesitated to act (European Parliament 2014b). 
 The main issues in the negotiations on the SRM concerned the centralisation 
of decision-making power, the scope of the SRM, the sources of funding and the legal 
basis of the new mechanism. German opposition to the Commission’s draft directive 
on the SRM stemmed from concerns over moral hazard both for banks and for 
sovereigns, legal difficulties and the structure of the Germany banking system. More 
crudely put, the German government disliked both having to pay for the closure of 
foreign banks and empowering foreigners to close German banks. The Commission 
proposal envisaged that decision-making power would be assigned to the Commission 
itself. Some Member States, first and foremost Germany, argued that decision-making 
power should rest with national resolution authorities individually and then 
collectively in the EU Council of Ministers. The Commission pushed for SRM 
coverage of all EU banks, whereas the Germans insisted upon coverage of only the 
largest systemically important cross-border banks. As for funding the new mechanism, 
the Commission proposed the creation of a Common Resolution Fund, funded by 
industry, but some Member States, particularly Germany, opposed this idea. The 
fourth issue concerned the legal basis of the SRM, in particular whether it required 
treaty revision, as requested by German policy-makers, or not, as argued by the 
Commission, the ECB, France, Italy and Spain, which were keen to speed up the 
establishment of the SRM.  
By March 2014, Banking Union Member States had agreed a complicated set 
of bank resolution procedures. In the space of less than two years, all the main 
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elements of Banking Union – except the Common Deposit Guarantee System – had 
been agreed. Yet most observers were highly sceptical of the institutional design of 
the nascent Banking Union – and in particular the Single Resolution Mechanism – 
and its potential contribution to banking and financial system stability (see, for 
example, Münchau 2014). For the euro area periphery, the delayed and complex SRM 
agreed failed to provide the clear backstop that they sought to prevent doubts about 
the solvency of national governments from undermining confidence in their domestic 
banks. In other words, it remained unlikely that the institutions and procedures agreed 
would significantly undermine the sovereign debt-bank doom loop. The process of 
‘squaring’ the inconsistent quartet was and would continue to be highly contentious 
and complicated. Future institutional and procedural modifications were almost 
inevitable and the road to an effective Banking Union remained a steep ascent.   
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